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Judith Butler and the Althusserian theory of subjection 
 
Pierre Macherey 
 
Trans. Stephanie Bundy, New York University 
 
I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a 
way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits 
them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have 
called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined 
along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or 
other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ [Note: Hailing as an everyday 
practice subject to a precise ritual takes a quite ‘special’ form in 
the policeman’s practice of ‘hailing’ which concerns the hailing 
of ‘suspects’.] 
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined 
takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. 
By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical 
conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has 
recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that 
‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else). 
Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of 
hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call 
or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him 
who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and 
one which cannot be explained solely by ‘guilt feelings’, despite 
the large numbers who ‘have something on their consciences’. 
Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little 
theoretical theatre I have had to present things in the form of a 
sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in the form of a 
temporal succession. There are individuals walking along. 
Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: ‘Hey, you 
there!’ One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right one) 
turns round, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i.e. 
recognizing that ‘it really is he’ who is meant by the hailing. But 
in reality these things happen without any succession. The 
existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of 
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individuals as subjects are one and the same thing. (L. Althusser, 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” trans. Ben 
Brewster, in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, 1976, p. 118) 
In the original manuscript from which the text of the article “Idéologie et 
appareils idéologiques d’Etat (notes pour une recherche),” one of Althusser’s 
most well-known and discussed writings, published in La Pensée in June 
1970, was extracted, he states, at the beginning of the seventh chapter of this 
manuscript (titled “On Ideology”): 
The theses I am about to put forward are certainly not off the 
cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i.e. confirmed or 
rejected, except by much thorough study and analysis. 
I therefore ask both extreme vigilance and extreme 
indulgence on the part of the reader in the face of the 
propositions I venture to put forth [que je vais risquer] [Editor’s 
note: In the manuscript ‘to expose/to confess’ is typed over the 
last word is the phrase]. 
At the moment of the initial drafting of his text, Althusser had therefore 
sensed that he had much to draw upon in “exposing/confessing” 
[exposant/avouant] the analytic content that he presented as constituting 
the outline of a general theory of ideology, a theory which he remarked, in 
fact bemoaned, was absent in Marx itself, an absence that he proposed to fill. 
The fact that the term “confess” should have come spontaneously from his 
pen allowed, in his view, the characterization of his theses’ exposition to be 
taken, perhaps, as a symptom of his consciousness or semi-consciousness of 
the very personal nature of the undertaking which, by remaining in the 
background throughout, sustained his thinking, an undertaking that had 
theoretical meaning and value only if it set in motion a process of discussion 
that allows its validity and range to be put to the test by confirming or 
invalidating the results. Althusser, who was accustomed to citing, in the 
manner of Lenin, the expression which Napoleon Bonaparte used to 
summarize his conduct on the battlefield, “we engage and then we will see 
[on s’engage, et puis on voit],” thus could have perfectly applied this maxim 
to his own approach as a theoretician of ideology, who, in order to see, 
advances by taking risks, by theses, by knowing perfectly well that these 
theses have value only as hypotheses awaiting a test whose perspective they 
anticipate. In other words, by his own “confession”—to take up the term 
which he himself used—his investigation, from which he had at the time 
delivered only a few extracts under the title “Notes towards an investigation,” 
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appeared to be of a highly problematic nature, and as a result called for a 
reading that he characterized as needing to be at once “vigilant” and 
“indulgent”: indulgent with respect to the risky nature of the theses in 
question, which required the most extreme vigilance, in the sense of a critical 
attention, regarding the validity of their contents. 
It is precisely this type of reading that we find in Judith Butler’s The 
Psychic Life of Power, whose chapter 4 is titled “‘Conscience Doth Make 
Subjects of Us All’: Althusser's Subjection.” In reading this section of 
Butler’s book, we realize that she took as seriously as possible Althusser’s 
proposed analyses on the subject of ideological interpellation, devoting to 
them the kind of attention that they very much call for: namely a critical 
attention that, in adhering closely to the content of these analyses, attempts 
to seize from within their hidden logic, with a view to eventually detecting 
therein indeterminacies and defects of form. Butler even goes so far as to 
propose applying to Althusser himself the method of “symptomatic reading,” 
whose schema he had elaborated in Reading Capital, with the aim of 
characterizing the particular procedure that attempts to identify, behind 
what a text says, what it does not say, and of which it consequently 
constitutes the “symptom,” and not a totally developed argument. Of what 
are Althusser’s theses on ideology and the organic link that it fosters with 
the constitution of the subject the symptom? What is it that they say 
without saying or explicitly announcing? This is what Butler’s reading 
intends to diagnose, by reconstructing that which, in other terms, one would 
call their unthought [impensé], that is to say that which allows them to be 
thought without being thought, at least completely, that is without having 
been entirely spelled out. 
In the following manner, Butler specifies the content of this 
unthought, as she sees it, by proceeding to an exacting and vigilant reading 
of Althusser’s text: “The present chapter attempts to reread that essay to 
understand how interpellation is essentially figured through the religious 
example” (113). And, a bit further along: “The concern here has a more 
specific textual aim, namely, to show how these figures—examples and 
analogies—inform and extend conceptualizations, implicating the text in an 
ideological sanctification of religious authority which it can expose only by 
reenacting that authority” (114). 
In other words, according to Butler, a theory of authority is developed 
in Althusser’s text, one which is marked through-and-through by 
exploitation of the religious paradigm, which consequently holds, according 
3
Macherey and Bundy: Judith Butler and the Althusserian Theory of Subjection
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
  
to the very plan at the heart of this theory, that to submit oneself to the legal 
principle of authority, whatever it may be, by subjectively upholding this 
submission in the terms proposed by ideology, is ultimately the same as 
responding positively, animated by an unwavering religious conviction, to a 
call issued by God himself in the absolute, and therefore literally giving 
oneself up to this call, in a meaning of the verb “to give” [rendre] akin to 
that which it takes in the formulation “to give up ones weapons” [rendre les 
armes], which refers to adopting the posture of the vanquished. Now it is 
possible that this theoretical exposition in fact does nothing else, and therein 
would be its own unthought: the re-staging or re-playing (rejouer) for its 
own account, in the manner in which it exploits the religious paradigm of 
authority, the mechanism that it claims to reveal, and this through a theory 
of submission to authority that would be in its very principle subjected to 
this same paradigm, which, in these conditions, it can only reproduce, 
although it apparently offers to reveal it. What the symptomatic reading 
aims for is therefore the fact that the theory of the interpellation of the 
individual as subject would be ultimately only a blind, uncontrolled reprise, 
by the author of the theory in question, of the mechanism that it is meant to 
describe objectively, without being in any fashion implicated in it, which is 
not the case in reality. When, in Althusser’s original text, the term “confess” 
first spilled from his pen in order to designate the manner in which he puts 
forth his theory (by being conscious of taking a maximum amount of risks), 
he himself confirms the suspicion of the “confessional regime” that his 
theoretical analysis ultimately establishes, which supposes the personal 
implication of the author of the analysis in its contents, by a relationship 
from which he is incapable of distancing himself. To put it more simply and 
more brutally, Butler finds Althusser’s theory much too “Catholic” in the 
sense that it is intimately marked by a certain conception of authority, in 
origin religious, which it has not acknowledged (insofar as in reality it 
submits to it in a sense very near to that of ideological submission), which 
disallows it the scientific character that, incidentally, it claims for itself; 
behind the supposedly general theory of ideology, there would be in fact 
nothing other than a particular ideology of ideology that identifies at first 
glance, without the ability to justify or even attempt to justify the general 
process of ideologization and the production of subjectivity in the particular 
model of religious inculcation and the representation of authority taken as 
absolute authority or a call issued by a divine voice that this model 
establishes. 
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It is therefore possible that when he writes about the ideological 
constitution of the subject through the mechanism of interpellation, 
Althusser ultimately does nothing other than speak of his own constitution 
as Althusser-subject, as his singular history led him to integrate the principle 
of submission into authority of a religious type, so that his entire thought 
would appear as if haunted or possessed to the point of projecting this 
principle upon the entire field of reality to which he devoted his 
investigation. However, we must note that the use of a religious paradigm as 
a means to form an account of the mechanisms of ideology (if this is indeed 
the goal of Althusser’s enterprise, which remains to be confirmed) leads back 
to a much earlier tradition, a tradition that resurfaces in Marx himself, since 
his writings arise from the idea that religious consciousness constitutes the 
archetypal ideological form, which raises the question of knowing if he 
managed to effectively distance himself from this originary hypothesis 
thereafter. When, in 1845, Marx envisioned putting the concept of ideology 
back into circulation in its original form, an approach based upon an 
unfulfilled moment, since he had left the text of The German Ideology 
incomplete and had declined to publish it, he did so in reappropriating for 
himself, in his own manner, the schema of reversal that Feuerbach 
developed in The Essence of Christianity, which explains how the human 
being, in a thoroughly natural, original manner, is constituted as a religious 
subject through a dispossession of self or an alienation that transforms his 
essence into the property of a transcendent, divine essence, while this last is 
in fact only a mirror image, turned over and reversed, of its original nature. 
At the time Marx, along with other heterodox “Young Hegelians” such as 
Hess and Engels had been profoundly marked by Feuerbach’s analysis, 
whose model they sought to transpose into the political, then into the 
economic, without altering its spirit, a spirit expressed in a condensed form 
by the concept of alienation. And Marx’s reflections on the subject reached a 
turning point when, in his “ad Feuerbach” series of notes whose contents 
were only released by Engels after his death under the title “Theses on 
Feuerbach,” he realized that it was necessary to finish with Feuerbach’s 
concept of human essence and substitute in its place the concept of “social 
relations” [rapports socials] (gesellschaftliche Verhaltnisse); however, this 
had not deterred him from later reusing, in the first section of book I of 
Capital, consecrated to “commodity fetishism,” the Feuerbachian schema of 
reversal with the aim of integrating it directly into the analysis of economic 
reality, which consequently relegated the term, if not the concept, of 
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“ideology” to the background. Althusser’s very first works took it as their 
goal to assess the actual scope of Feuerbach’s influence on the young Marx’s 
inquiries, and it was on the basis of this that he elaborated the concept of 
“rupture” [coupure]. From this, we can conclude that the reflections on 
ideology within a religious paradigm had, far beyond what is represented in 
Althusser’s work, insofar as its status has occupied Marxism form the time of 
its emergence, a very large scope: what we must ask ourselves, therefore, is 
whether the reprise of this paradigm that he himself effects constitutes an 
original contribution that must be characterized in and of itself and whose 
value remains to be measured and discussed. 
As Judith Butler presents the Althusserian reference to a religious 
paradigm, it emerges according to her terms from “an ideological 
sanctification of religious authority” (114) defined by two specific traits: on 
the one hand, it confers an absolute dimension on ideological submission, 
which results in the impossibility of ignoring or avoiding the call of “divine” 
law to which this submission supplies the response that it authoritatively 
demands; on the other, this response, which thus takes the pure form of 
obligation, can only, even though Althusser himself addresses this point 
which manifestly hinders him in his text, be put forward on the basis of guilt 
[culpabilite], insofar as the ideological subject who, by turning back, reacts 
under duress to the interpellation that addresses him, from behind, in the 
legal voice of authority, and determines to do so, or rather is determined to 
do so, only because he feels himself “called” in the deepest sense, an 
obligation from which it is absolutely impossible to shrink. What most 
particularly attracts Butler’s attention is that this manner of accounting for 
the production of the subject-effect, through the response brought upon by 
the call of law that intervenes in a context such as that of sovereign authority, 
identifies it as the function of an automatism: if he who lays claim to the 
status of subject turns back in response to the voice from behind that hails 
him, and becomes subject precisely in effecting this gesture, that is to say 
under the condition of having effected it, it is because he cannot do 
otherwise, insofar as he does not have at his disposal, prior to this response 
to the call that constitutes his movement of turning back, a real capacity of 
judgment and reflection that permits him to decide to do it or not; in effect, 
if he had this possibility of choice, the authority to whom he submits himself 
would not display an absolute or “divine” and thus unconditional nature: we 
must resort to the subtleties of a necessary grace in order to master the 
alternative between liberty and obligation, and in order to explain that the 
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freely consenting choices of the religious subject can only be effected because 
they are predetermined. The atmosphere of guilt that accompanies the 
process of the constitution of the subject therefore expresses nothing other 
than religious conviction in its principle, a conviction well anchored in the 
one who responds to the call by turning back, which he is destined to do, 
and one is tempted to say that he is programmed to adopt this type of 
behavior, thus coming to occupy a place that is assigned to him at the start, 
which explains that this behavior can be reduced to the functioning of an 
automatism acting under duress, without the possibility of a deviation 
[écart], without a gap between the moment when the call is received and 
that in which a response comes about, a response for which there is no 
alternative position imaginable, which excludes, on the behalf of the one 
who turns back, all hesitation, the operation that makes him into a subject, 
since, in the line of thought traced by Althusser, one is not born a subject, 
but becomes one, not freely however, but automatically, under the irresistible 
pressure exercised by the sovereign call of law: from this it follows that to be 
constrained [contraint], to be conscious, and to be subject are one and the 
same thing expressed in three different ways. 
To this way of seeing things, Butler opposes an argument which is, as 
she puts it, “grammatical” (117). If the subject is such under the condition of 
having responded on command to an exterior, and consequently 
transcendental, call, and if, being absolutely unable to do otherwise, he 
provided this response because he had lived, haunted, by an unshakeable 
feeling of guilt that pushes him to act precisely in this manner, then at the 
same time another question is raised, a question that, formulated in 
grammatical terms, is that of “who”: who responded to the call? Who 
originally felt himself to be guilty? From the perspective adopted by 
Althusser, it is certainly not the subject himself: he is not conscious of the 
feeling of guilt of which he is the unfortunate vehicle or the point of 
application, and he does not exist prior to the response he submits to the call, 
a response which he does not, properly speaking, authorize, which crucifies 
him in the deepest sense of his very being. But then, who is this “very 
being,” shot through with a feeling of guilt, who bears a weight for which he 
himself is not responsible? Or should we say, rather, which is he? what is he? 
in an effort to focus on that “thing” that is not yet a subject but instead is 
only “called” to become one, and who effectively becomes one in 
automatically turning back towards the call issued from the sovereign voice 
of authority that orders him to come and occupy the position of a subject, a 
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position to which it had been called, and in some ways requisitioned? Upon 
examination, the ritualistic formula of interpellation as it is mentioned by 
Althusser—“Hey! You! Over there!”—reveals itself to be entirely as 
ambiguous as the sacramental speech which allegedly effects the miraculous 
operation of transubstantiation over the course of a mass: “This is my body!” 
In this last affirmation, what exactly does “this” mean? Does it refer to the 
piece of bread that materially predates the operation to which it lends itself, 
or is this the result of that, that is to say the mystic body of Christ that the 
piece of bread ultimately became after the magical pronouncement had been 
made? And similarly, when the fatal interpellation is thrown forth from 
behind he who will inevitably turn back because he cannot fail to do so, who 
or what is this “you” to whom it is addressed? Is it someone or something 
that existed already before the call, and plays in this case a role analogous to 
that of the piece of bread, or is it what it became after having responded to 
the call, an “it” that thus absolutely merits the name of a “him,” that is of a 
subject capable of speaking in his own name, or believing himself to be 
capable of doing so, as a result of the new dignity that his submission to the 
law’s call has conferred upon him that in some way enthrones the subject? 
One thing is certain: in the two incriminated phases, “Hey! You! Over 
there!” and “This is my body!” neither “you” nor “this” have a purely 
constative weight; in other words neither serves to designate a reality 
independent of their enunciation, yet they play out performatively in the 
sense that they represent the action by which “you” and “this” become what 
the phrases that employ them call them to become, or order them to become, 
in the absolute. This tends to confirm that with the Althusserian theory of 
ideological interpellation, we would be plunged into a liturgical type of 
speculation which tends to align the process of inculcation with that of 
transubstantiation by exploiting a paradigm that, taken at its source, takes up 
religion and its astonishing practices. 
Bearing in mind this analysis and the type of objections that it 
produces, one could try, in the first place, to respond by asking if it is 
reasonable to place absolute trust in the rules of grammar: ultimately, those 
that do nothing more than reflect or sanction previously taken positions, 
statements of fact that they cannot possibly account for and upon which, 
consequently, they are not in a position to cast really new light? Butler 
herself takes up this type of inquiry, which relativizes the scope of the 
grammatical argument: 
Is it a failing of Althusser not to provide the subject prior to the 
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formation of the subject, or does his “failure” indicate only that 
the grammatical requirements of the narrative work against the 
account of subject formation that the narrative attempts to 
provide? To literalize or to ascribe an ontological status to the 
grammatical requirement of “the subject” is to presume a 
mimetic relation between grammar and ontology which misses 
the point, both Althusserian and Lacanian, that the 
anticipations of grammar are always and only retroactively 
installed. The grammar that governs the narration of subject 
formation presumes that the grammatical place for the subject 
has already been established. In an important sense, then, the 
grammar that the narrative requires results from the narrative 
itself. The account of subject formation is thus a double fiction 
at cross-purposes with itself, repeatedly symptomatizing what 
resists narration. (124) 
What can be found implicitly in discussion here is the thesis, supported by 
Ricoeur, according to which to be subject is to be in a position to confess in 
the proper manner, that returns anew to the first model, increasing in 
importance, of the religious paradigm: in effect, to confess is to account for 
oneself, which supposes that one should do so before an authority of 
supreme judgment, whether by confessing one’s faults so that they may be 
pardoned, or by pleading not guilty. But, as Butler justly points out, such an 
approach is retroactive and non-constitutive: to confess oneself, with a mind 
to exist as a subject, is in fact to confirm, by responding to an accusation 
under the form of a plea, and therefore upon the basis of supposed guilt, a 
preexisting nature that constitutes the veritable subject of the narrative 
through which it exposes itself, from the perspective of perfect circularity, 
whose value is justificatory and not at all explicative. Althusser’s approach is 
of an entirely other type, one which, from his point of view, resolutely 
distances itself from theological reference that, conversely, underlies the 
entire theory of the subject as defended by Ricoeur. This approach short-
circuits the supposed necessity of having to confess, or to make confession in 
order to exist: in effect, in the scene of interpellation, the only formula that 
must be pronounced is that of the anonymous call, “Hey! You! Over there!” 
to which the response, incidentally, is not verbal, since it consists solely of 
the gesture of turning back extorted by the abusive voice of authority. The 
only “rhetoric” admitted by Althusser is that of the gesture, which underlines 
the particularly insistent reference that he makes to Pascal’s idea according 
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to which one need not believe in order to kneel (s’agenouiller) because, 
inversely, it is by completing the gesture of kneeling that one really gives 
oneself over to belief. The question-answer procedure through which the 
production of the subject is accomplished therefore does not occur through 
representations susceptible to being translated with the aid of grammatically 
correct phrases (otherwise they would risk being inadmissible), but rather 
relies upon that which Bourdieu calls “practical meaning,” that is to say upon 
modes of behavior inscribed in the materiality of the body that do not posit 
the intervention of any ideality of spiritual type in order to be efficient. In 
this context, objections taken from grammar lose all value. If, in such a 
situation, the question-answer relation assumes the allure of an automatism, 
it is because it brings into play, as Bourdieu explains as well, not voluntarily 
reasoned, and as such confessable, choices, but habitus inculcated by a 
disciplinary path, from which it is consequently impossible to stray, despite 
what the rule of grammar may say. 
To which we ought to add the following remark: does the theory of 
interpellation as such transgress the rules of grammar? Is it not necessary 
rather to admit that this theory is based upon other rules that themselves 
conform to the rules of grammar inasmuch as they make use of such an 
extensive menu of usages that it cannot be restored to a standard model? Let 
us return once more to our point of departure: What Butler, for her part, 
raised as an objection, or at the very least as a surprise, is the conceit, 
syntactically contestable from her point of view, of formulating phrases 
without an immediately assignable subject. Yet language normally offers the 
possibility of composing this type of phrase. In “it rains” (Il pleut), which is 
certainly not a performative utterance, but rather simply describes an event 
which is unfortunately much too frequent for the taste of some, “it” 
designates neither something nor someone; whereas, in another context, for 
example in the phrase “he cries” (Il pleure), which does not display a 
performative nature either, “he” (Il) inarguably represents the person to 
whom we can attribute the action of shedding tears. “It” (Il), in “it rains,” 
acts not under the guise of a personal pronoun, but as a neutral designative: 
“it rains” aims to say, with a nearly imperceptible nuance, “that rains” (ça 
pleut), while “that cries” (ça pleure), an implicitly depreciative formulation, 
would express something entirely other than “he cries,” precisely in that it 
denies to the he or she who cries the authentic status of personhood. We 
could maintain that the approach followed by Althusser tends to build upon 
the use of phrases composed in the model of “it rains” or “that rains”: the 
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becoming-subject or subject-to-be (devenir-sujet), such as he is 
reconstituted by the scene of interpellation, is in some ways the process 
through which there is that which we call “of the subject” [du sujet], and “of 
the subject” constituted through-and-through by ideology; in this manner, 
the production of the subject, or rather we should say the production of the 
subject in the field of ideology, could be properly conveyed by a phrase like 
“that becomes of the I”[ça devient du je], which gets across the fact that the 
result of the transformation, namely “of the I” [du je] or “an I” [un je], 
therefore a thing worthy of being counted under the genre “I” [je], remains 
marked throughout by the originally impersonal character of “that” (ça) out 
of which it was formed, and a subject constituted under such conditions will 
never be the free subject, entirely master of himself, spoken of by idealistic 
metaphysics, but is instead condemned to remain a “subject-thing” or a 
“subject-effect,” which is to say that thing or that effect produced in the 
guise of a subject in the framework of the process of interpellation. 
This is what Althusser tried to theorize by additionally putting forth 
the concept of the process without a subject: because the process through 
which the subject comes to be is, considered in itself, without subject, it 
would be possible to describe it by using phrases such as “it rains” [il pleut] 
or “that rains” [ça pleut], and this underlines the non-subjective, and 
consequently objective, character of the phenomenon in question. From this 
perspective, to become a subject is to be objectified or ideologized, in other 
words, to be welcomed into the realm of ideology, which is the fate of each 
child called to transform himself into an adult, according to the lesson that 
Althusser, along with others, developed in his text on “Freud and Lacan” by 
proposing a rectified and probably tendentious version of Lacanianism. And 
to be ideologized is to be socialized, under the authority of a common law 
that constitutes or “calls” the subject, in the sense that, for example, on the 
first day of the school year the call is made, as a summons thrown forth that, 
de facto, addresses itself not to those subjects that are already constituted 
insofar as it is itself the means by which they are identified as such, as 
recognized respondents to the call who, once this verification is effected, 
conform to the proper demands of the label “subject” or the label “student.” 
Understood thus, Althusser’s entire effort would have consisted of 
neutralizing to the maximum the presentation of the process of subjection or 
the production of the subject, by trying to reestablish with the aid of phrases 
in which the reference to a grammatical subject finds itself systematically 
eluded; nonetheless, the fact remains that such phrases must be 
11
Macherey and Bundy: Judith Butler and the Althusserian Theory of Subjection
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
  
grammatically correct. Of the subject, it is necessary to say in proper terms 
that “it produces itself,” in the sense that one says of an event that it 
produces “itself ” [se], by referring “itself ” [se] not to an alleged author of 
the event in question, upon which this author exercises complete mastery, 
but as the result of the process through an intermediary out of which the 
event produced itself, a process that is, as we have come to call it, a process 
without an anteriorly assignable subject. From here, the dynamic of 
subjection finds itself objectified, that is to say properly de-subjectified: it 
does not depend on the subject in person to become subject, which he 
achieves only at the close of an operation of which he is not the master, and 
in regard to it is possible to say that this is effected under constraint, insofar 
as it leaves no place for initiative coming from the subject himself. 
According to Althusser, such an approach is that which is most in keeping 
with a materialist position in philosophy: to neutralize the operation of 
subjection with a view to objectifying it is to bring to light the fact that it 
ultimately relies upon material conditions, conditions that produce “of the 
subject” [du sujet] without being themselves dependent upon the pre-
existing position of a subject. 
This, however, creates a difficulty. Until what point is the neutralizing 
and objectifying approach of which we have been speaking successful? Does 
it succeed in completely eliminating the subjective as such from the process 
of subjection, which it attempts to do by reducing its status to that of a result 
of this process that only appears at its close, once the process has unfolded in 
its entirety? Has it not in fact simply displaced the position of the subject, a 
displacement that leaves intact the constitution of the subject? Is not the 
process without subject still, in a different form, the process with subject? 
Exiting through one door, does the subject not return through another? 
To respond to these interrogations, let us begin by taking a path other 
than the one chosen by Butler. We must admit that a phrase composed 
according to the rules of neutrality leaves vacant the place normally occupied 
by the subject in phrases where actions relate back to personal pronouns, “I,” 
“you,” “he,” “us,” etc. . . . : in a formula of the same type as “it is produced” 
or “it produces itself ” [ça se produit] or “that took place” [ça a lieu], “it” [ça] 
designates a void that the evoked action must fill. But is this void not 
apparent in reality? Is it not already occupied, filled with something that 
thus becomes, implicitly, the veritable subject of the operation? Thus this 
implicit subject, “whatever” [quel] it is, failing to be a “who” [qui]? Hence 
that which one offers up, for the process of subjection, to be neutralized, and 
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as a result objectified, returns to be socialized. But what does it mean to be 
socialized? 
The debate Butler started around the scene of interpellation pushed to 
the foreground the question of knowing who, in the context of this scene, is 
called. And it is precisely in the domain opened by this inquiry that we 
witness the return of something that resembles a subject, firmly planted on 
both feet, under the auspices of the grand subject “Society,” that, through 
the intermediary of its representative or placeholder “Ideology,” ultimately 
exercises mastery over the process of subjection by exercising total control 
over the multitude of small, personalized subjects that in the end are nothing 
other than its products/offspring, its “children” or its “students” that it 
inventoried in issuing the call. If this is so, the process of subjection 
rediscovers a subject, that is to say an overseer, who imparts to it its 
orientation, directs it in a certain sense, contingent on interests that, 
supposedly, belong to it: this subject would be “the Society,” or rather, we 
would be tempted to say as a pastiche of Lacanian language, the “thesociety” 
(lasociete). The problem is that this “thesociety” such as it is means the great 
society-subject, that predates the process of subjection and constitutes the 
source of the call launched in the framework of the symbolic scene of 
interpellation, does not exist, except in the name of a fiction that comes to 
justify the operation a posteriori, once it is effected, but in no way accounts 
for the effective cause. What exists in reality is a dynamic of socialization 
that, following the neutralizing logic adopted by the theory of interpellation, 
must be itself a process without subject, which means that something like 
the “thesociety” constitutes its end and in no sense its point of departure. 
But then, what is to be found at the point of departure, or rather at the base 
of this process? According to Marx’s decisive observation, it is that which 
can be found recorded for the first time in the sixth of his “theses” on 
Feuerbach, “the ensemble of the social relations” [“das ensemble der 
gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnissen”, “l ’ensemble (en francais dans le texte 
original) des rapports sociaux”], that is to say, not that already constituted 
and indissoluble organic totality that would be the “thesociety”, in the 
singular, but the unstable complex of antagonistic forces, in the plural, 
whose conflicts, at each instant, make, unmake, and remake that which is 
nothing but a precarious resultant. From this point of view, he must move 
away from the great subject “Society” as he moves away from the small 
personal subject created in its image, that, the both of them, are 
manufactured in a context of relations of force in which equilibrium is not at 
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all guaranteed. Consequently, in order to dispose of the religious paradigm 
and detheologize or desacralize (desacraliser) the analysis of social fact in 
keeping with the spirit that should in principle define a substantive 
materialist attitude we must renounce once and for all reference to abstract 
entities which assume a character of absolute right (droit), like “society,” 
“law,” “authority,” “power,” and that are at most recurrent fictions, that is to 
say ideological constructions stripped of material referents in reality, or 
rather that have material referents in reality other than those that they signal 
in the first degree. 
In light of these reflections, it is possible to return anew to the 
objection Butler raised according to which the “ideological sanctification of 
religious authority” impresses its stamp upon the presentation of the scene of 
interpellation insofar as it confers an absolute dimension upon the call that 
constitutes the driving force of the scene, which once again brings up the 
fact that the response to the call appears as the function of an automatism, 
without the possibility of lag between the question asked and the response it 
brings. This objection must be taken extremely seriously. Putting forth a 
theory of subjection that forges an act of submission carried out under 
constraint in the becoming-subject inevitably raises the question of knowing 
where this constraint comes from, where it gathers the strength to make 
itself obeyed without discussion, hence automatically. And yet, if one admits 
that this constraint comes from nowhere, since no central seat exists that 
would occupy the stable position from which it would be emitted, one must 
at the same time recognize that it does not display an absolute character, 
even if, a posteriori, once its result is obtained, it can ideally represent itself 
in this manner. In reality, there is no obligation to turn oneself around 
following the shouted summons “Hey! You! Over there!” and—if we agree 
to call “one” (on) the target of such an interpellation— “one” could just as 
well turn away from the call. It is at this point that the entirely disciplinary 
perspective adopted by Bourdieu reaches its limit, insofar as it implies that 
the response to the call issued by the voice of interpellation should already be 
entirely presupposed in the question addressed by this voice, which is a 
prejudice of the sociologist who, in order to safeguard the permanence of his 
discipline, needs to believe that something like the “thesociety” exists, 
endowed with authority and power that, in practice, would not be open to 
being challenged. 
The question is thus to know if, in the space opened by the choice 
between turning back and not doing so, obeying or disobeying, something 
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can assert itself that would merit the name and the dignity of the free and 
conscious subject, master of his actions in that he would ultimately decide 
upon them. Why orient oneself to one side rather than the other? What is it 
to choose or to decide, and does such an undertaking necessitate a prior 
position for the subject, determining who decides or chooses? But, would it 
not be the case that to say that the subject is that which determines the 
action is precisely to assign to it a cause from which it is impossible to escape, 
and consequently to restore it to the character of an obligation? In essence, 
knowing what or who is the cause of the action matters little, the law that 
claims to make itself obeyed or the person who understands himself as 
determined in an autonomous manner: what is essential is that the carrying 
out of the action is ascribed to a causal determinism whose principle can be 
furnished equally well by the authority of law or by the liberty of a person. 
The benefit that one might expect from a neutralizing analysis guided by the 
notion of the process without subject, and we can presently specify that it is 
without subject or cause, is precisely that it permits one to evade this type of 
choice, that of the internal and the external as well as that of the subjective 
and the objective, or moreover that this introduces, on the one hand, the 
idea that dominates the client’s mind in the form of a conscious 
representation and which is supposed to order his behavior and, on the other 
hand, his material conduct such as it is carried out in practice and not solely 
in theory. In reality, in the context delineated by “the ensemble of social 
relations,” the two sides of these different choices communicate and 
interpenetrate permanently, creating each time circumstantial equilibria 
liable to be challenged at any moment. 
But is it truly a process without subject or cause? Is it such an aleatory 
dynamic that it would become definitively impossible to return it to reason, 
that is, to a perspective from which it can be explained? If this is the case, 
then the thesis of interpellation misses its mark, which is to free up the 
conditions in which the production of the subject is effected, conditions that 
can act as if they were stripped of the dimension of necessity that precisely 
makes them effective, efficient, and effectual conditions. Examining the 
matter more closely, this is not at all the case: a process without subject or 
cause is in reality a process that is its own subject for itself and its own cause, 
insofar as it generates, by reinventing at every moment, at its own risk and 
expense, the figures of necessity through which it is deployed, unless these 
figures bear a relation to a prior entity, of the “thesociety [lasociete] or 
“theperson” [lapersonne] type that would constitute the causa proxima or 
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remota. From this vantage point, it becomes necessary to address, along with 
the subject-effect, the society-effect, meaning a dynamic of socialization 
cannot be restored to an already mapped out structure. Consequently, there 
is no place for the traditional debate between the two alternative types of 
society, the closed society and the open society: every effect of socialization 
takes up at once a logic of closure [clos] and a logic of openness [ouvert], 
from which it renegotiates equilibrium at each instant, that is to say, in each 
conjuncture, without any model of reference other than that of a retroactive 
guarantee that tends at least partially to mask its true nature. This is the 
reason why, according to the perspective offered by the conception of a 
process without subject or cause, the choice between constraint and liberty 
have with reason, and no more than those who had been evoked before them, 
been presented in a fixed manner, in the name of a relation of exclusion of 
the type “either/or” [“ou bien… ou bien…”]. The practical behavior of 
turning back through which the subject is subjected is, following the 
viewpoint through which one considers it, free as well as constrained, insofar 
as it obeys at once the two logics that Spinoza calls agere and operari, two 
sides of human existence that are not at all exclusive, but that, in some 
manner, are translations into two different languages: agere is to be freely 
determined to adopt a behavior taking place in the frame of a process 
without subject or cause; and operari is to act under the pressure of rules 
which cannot be disobeyed. Now all human behavior without exception at 
once depends upon these two explicative types, whose relation must be 
restructured at each instance. 
But this is not the perspective that Butler adopts in her effort to 
answer the question of knowing until what point and under what conditions 
the neutralizing and objectifying approach revealed by the scene of 
interpellation, attains its declared aims, effectively producing the subject as 
comprehending everything that could be attributed to the concept of the 
subject, without the residue that, escaping analysis, would thus constitute its 
“remainder.” What principally attracts her attention is the thematic of 
culpability that, associated with that of the automatism of the act of turning 
back, reveals the subordination of the Althusserian theory of subjection to 
the religious paradigm. As she recalls at the very end of chapter 4 of The 
Psychic Life of Power, “the theological impulse also structures Althusser's 
work in the figure of the punitive law” (127). The voice that issues the call 
[appel] that the gesture of turning back responds to is not only expected to 
enforce obedience, and without appeal [sans appel], but it also proceeds by a 
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punitive logic that would not function if it were not based, in part, upon, 
“that one” [“celui”] to whom it is applied, in the form of a feeling or a 
potential recognition of guilt that gives the scene of interpellation its horizon 
of expectation [horizon d’attente]. This is why the production of the subject, 
as the declaration of obedience reveals once it is obtained, supposes as 
prerequisite something like an intention or a desire to obey, unconscious of 
course, whose origin can only be a “that one” [“celui”] or a subject predating 
the production of the subject: this results in the fact that, in order to really 
effect this production, there needs to be a subject there already, a subject 
carrying the motor of guilt that inclines it towards submitting itself to the 
voice that calls, by adopting an obedient posture that corresponds not solely 
to the functioning of an automatism because it also consists of the 
fulfillment of a desire. 
Here is how Butler develops this point: 
For the conscience which compels the wayward pedestrian to 
turn around upon hearing the policeman's address or urges the 
murderer into the streets in search of the police appears to be 
driven by a love of the law which can be satisfied only by ritual 
punishment. To the extent that Althusser gestures toward this 
analysis, he begins to explain how a subject is formed through 
the passionate pursuit of the reprimanding recognition of the 
state. That the subject turns round or rushes toward the law 
suggests that the subject lives in passionate expectation of the 
law. Such love is not beyond interpellation; rather, it forms the 
passionate circle in which the subject becomes ensnared by its 
own state. (128-9) 
First of all, as it is presented here, the turning-back behavior appears to be 
susceptible to taking two reciprocal forms: if, in the first degree—and it is 
from here that we have started—it consists of reacting to a voice 
representing an authority who calls from behind, from the back, it can also, 
as Butler suggests, come from the subject himself who, without being incited 
by who or what else, literally turns himself back towards the law, as one 
turns back spontaneously, driven by a personal impulse, towards an 
expedient authority from whom one seeks intervention, in the manner of a 
child who runs and throws himself into the arms of his parents when he feels 
himself to be in danger. At the beginning of chapter 4 of The Psychic Life of 
Power, Butler had already noted, with the aim of bringing to light the 
personal implication of the singular subject Althusser in his analysis (in 
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principle objective and impersonal) of the production of the subject, that in 
the account that he himself had given of Hélène’s murder in The Future 
Lasts Forever he instinctively returned to the interpellative scheme by 
inverting the scenario term by term, which he did by relating “how he 
rushed into the street calling for the police in order to deliver himself up to 
the law” (113). But is this connection pertinent? Is this the same Althusser, 
the same “subject,” to whom we can attribute the writing of “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses” and who is the author of the laborious and on 
the whole indecent confession that comprises The Future Lasts Forever? In 
writing his “memoirs,” which fed a most unhealthy curiosity, Althusser 
placed himself, in an effort to obtain a particular, certainly morbid type of 
satisfaction, in the posture of the subject as Ricoeur describes it. Such a 
subject is he who agrees to be held accountable because he feels at the 
deepest level of his “self ” that he cannot shrink back from the necessity of 
doing so, and is thus animated by the conviction that he is guilty, not only of 
having carried out certain reprehensible acts, but quite simply of being who 
he is or that one whom he is, who must be submitted to judgment because 
he deserves it in absolute terms, without the possibility of reprieve apart 
from that which he can eventually attain by confessing, that is, by freeing 
himself of the burden of his sins by some words, a behavior which, it is 
undeniable, could not be more religious in principle: because this subject, 
overburdened in every sense of the word, has been effectively theologized. 
But was this really the same Althusser, the same Althusser “subject” who 
had developed the theory of interpellation, and did guilt intervene under the 
same form in the presentation of this theory, presented, according to its own 
terms, in the guise of the “confession”? If, that is, we can reasonably ask 
what leads us to avoid the temptation to read the analysis developed in 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” and to measure therein its 
theoretical range in light of the position of supplication or martyrdom 
subsequently adopted by someone whose tragic personal circumstances have 
“brought [him] to his knees” in an entirely other sense than that which 
Pascalian kneeling [agenouillement] evokes, and in doing so led him to carry 
out an irreparable, unpardonable gesture, that no explanation could ever 
manage to justify: this is essentially a crucifixion. This is why we should not 
expect too much from the connection between the two approaches, that of 
the theoretician who attempts to develop a consistent and coherent analysis, 
consequently calling for a vigilant reading, and that of the “subject” who 
confesses in an effort to acquire pardon for a fault, in reality inexpiable, that, 
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if it condemns him personally, does not however alone suffice as a refutation 
of the contents of theses formulated in another place by someone who 
formally bears the same name, but who is perhaps not entirely “the same,” as 
any reader of Pirandello can easily understand. 
Let us therefore inquire as to what the thematic of guilt is, not from 
the point of view of personal fantasies of a “subject” for whom terrible events 
taking place in an extremely complex context that we will never truly know 
provide compelling reasons for judging him guilty, but from that which is 
the work’s principle objective, at least as we suppose it to be: the material 
and impersonal conditions for the production of the subject. The argument 
Butler advances is that this production would not reach its end if there was 
not, parallel to the mechanism of interpellation, a desire for law, taking the 
form of a spontaneous attachment to the principle of authority, which is 
expressed most directly as the feeling of guilt: to use her own terms, it is this 
“desire for the law” that “ensnares the subject” in the manner in which one 
ensnares birds through the use of decoys, which attract them in order to 
better catch them. And yet, for the subject to be thus “ensnared” it is 
necessary, it would seem, that he exist in one way or another before falling 
into the snare that is set for him. This is why, Butler explains, 
According to the logic of conscience, which fully constrains 
Althusser, the subject's existence cannot be linguistically 
guaranteed without passionate attachment to the law. This 
complicity at once conditions and limits the viability of a critical 
interrogation of the law. One cannot criticize too far the terms 
by which one's existence is secured. 
But if the discursive possibilities for existence exceed the 
reprimand voiced by the law, would that not lessen the need to 
confirm one's guilt and embark on a path of conscientiousness 
as a way to gain a purchase on identity? What are the 
conditions under which our very sense of linguistic survival 
depends upon our willingness to turn back upon ourselves, that 
is, in which attaining recognizable being requires self negation, 
requires existing as a self-negating being in order to attain and 
preserve a status as "being" at all? (129-30) 
What exactly does Butler mean to say when she asserts that “the logic of 
conscience [. . .] fully constrains Althusser ? What do we understand as “the 
logic of conscience”? In order to understand it, we must return to the earlier 
passage in chapter 4 of The Psychic Life of Power which refers to the 
19
Macherey and Bundy: Judith Butler and the Althusserian Theory of Subjection
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
  
conditions in which conscience emerges and succeeds in imposing its own 
logic: 
For Althusser, the efficacy of ideology consists in part in the 
formation of conscience, where the notion "conscience" is 
understood to place restrictions on what is speakable or, more 
generally, representable. Conscience cannot be conceptualized 
as a self-restriction, if that relation is construed as a pregiven 
reflexivity, a turning back upon itself performed by a ready-
made subject. Instead, it designates a kind of turning back—a 
reflexivity—which constitutes the condition of possibility for 
the subject to form. Reflexivity is constituted through this 
moment of conscience, this turning back upon oneself, which is 
simultaneous with a turning toward the law. This self-
restriction does not internalize an external law: the model of 
internalization takes for granted that an “internal” and 
“external” have already been formed. Instead, this self-
restriction is prior to the subject. It constitutes the inaugurating 
reflexive turn of the subject, enacted in anticipation of the law 
and hence determined by, having prejudicative foreknowledge 
of, the law. (114-5) 
Let us take up two essential points from this extremely dense analysis. Firstly, 
in order for the law to successfully impose itself, and therefore obtain the 
expected response to its call through which the subject is constituted, it is 
necessary that its call make itself heard as an interior, and not exterior, call; 
in other words, that it situate itself as the protraction of a need to obey 
coming from the deepest part of the subject himself: at the very end of the 
chapter of The Psychic Life of Power dedicated to Althusser, Butler invokes 
along these lines the ethics of the slave as Nietzsche describes it, in the 
capacity that it corresponds to the fulfillment of a certain will to being. 
What does the subject who submits himself to the law’s call “want”? Simply 
put, he wants “to be,” driven by the obscure premonition that, if he does not 
give the expected response, he will be cast off into the limbo of non-being, 
by completely ceasing to be recognized/known [“reconnu”]. Secondly, and 
this point is of course tied to the first, the logic of conscience into which the 
subject locks himself in order to thus succeed in making himself 
recognized/known, that is to say in order to attain “being,” has in principle a 
self-restriction, a self-negation: it is as if, in order to evade non-being, the 
conscious subject reaches the point of resigning himself to be less, by 
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voluntarily sacrificing a part of himself. This is in some manner the thematic 
of voluntary servitude that Butler reworks here, and we might wonder if, 
truly, the slave submits himself voluntarily, and does so because he has a 
conscience or prescience that he will need one to satisfy an intimate desire 
that pertains to him personally: in any case, it is not at all certain that this is 
the same point in question in Althusser’s analysis. 
That said, there is something in the interpretation of the theory of 
interpellation proposed by Butler that we must examine: the manner in 
which it exploits the thematic of conscience. Butler rightly says that this 
conscience does not intervene in the production of the subject under the 
form of a preexisting reflexivity, that shapes it into a clear conscience, in 
other words a conscience entirely on its own: in effect, this last conscience 
forms itself, in principle, only at the end of the process of which it 
constitutes one of the results. But then what type of conscience is it? It 
seems that it would be this sort of “bad” conscience, or conscience of guilt, 
that is indispensable for the constitution of “good” subjects. This line of 
thinking highlights a very important, and certainly criticizable and revisable, 
aspect of Althusser’s thesis, which is as follows: if the thesis succeeds in 
explaining the conditions under which good subjects are formed, such 
subjects who submit themselves to the call of law because they believe it to 
be “doing the right thing” (bien faire), it leaves completely aside the question 
of knowing whether there are only “good” subjects, in the same sense that 
during times of conscription one was declared “fit for service” (bon pour le 
ser vice), and whether there is not also the possibility, in the same context of 
the interpellative scene, of the advent of bad subjects, who do not give the 
right/good/proper (bonne) response, like those that Foucault indexed by 
arranging them under the heading of “infamous men” who had been rejected 
because they did not fit the conditions required by the call, this point being 
treated as a given despite the fact that it depends on their will, good or bad. 
Put otherwise, if the mechanism of interpellation plays out effectively in an 
automatic manner, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the 
functioning of this automatism leaves room for error; in other words, from 
time to time it does not work, or there is a problem, as if the machine breaks 
down for mysterious reasons that are not necessarily attributable to divine 
providence. Let us go further: would there not be, in every “good subject,” a 
part of the “bad” subject, who silently resists the pressure exercised upon him 
by the call of authority? And so, to be subject would be not only to satisfy a 
desire for legality inscribed in the deepest register of all being, but would 
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also be to be shared, or even rent, between two temptations straining in 
opposite directions, one striving to become a good subject, and the other 
striving to remain a bad one. By raising this hypothesis, it would perhaps be 
possible to break away from the theological phantasm that, we must admit, 
is not totally absent from the perspective adopted by Althusser, although we 
can conceive of its elimination without completely abandoning this 
perspective. 
It is in this sense that we can understand this remark, presented by 
Butler at the very end of chapter 4 of The Psychic Life of Power: 
Under what conditions does a law monopolize the terms of 
existence in so thorough a way? Or is this a theological fantasy 
of the law? Is there a possibility of being elsewhere or otherwise, 
without denying our complicity in the law that we oppose? 
Such possibility would re- quire a different kind of turn, one 
that, enabled by the law, turns away from the law, resisting its 
lure of identity, an agency that outruns and counters the 
conditions of its emergence. Such a turn demands a willingness 
not to be—a critical desubjectivation — in order to expose the 
law as less powerful than it seems. (130) 
In effect, law always has only the power that we concede to it, which tends 
to relativize, if not to totally negate, the authority that it wields. Thus there 
would be, in the same space opened by the functioning of authority, a place 
left vacant in which something like freedom or volition could “play” [jouer] 
in the sense that, as Foucault writes, “one finds the strength to break the 
rules through the very act of playing along with them.” 
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